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Abstract
We study the existence of equilibrium and rational bubbles in a Ram-
sey model with heterogeneous agents, borrowing constraints and endoge-
nous labor.
Applying a nonstandard fixed-point theorem by Gale and Mas-Colell’s
(1975), we prove the existence of equilibrium in a time-truncated bounded
economy. A common argument shows this solution to be an equilibrium
for any unbounded economy with the same fundamentals. Taking the limit
of a sequence of truncated economies, we eventually obtain the existence
of equilibrium in the Ramsey model.
In the second part of the paper, we address the issue of rational bubbles
and we prove that they never occur in a productive economy à la Ramsey.
Keywords: Existence of equilibrium, bubbles, Ramsey model, hetero-
geneous agents, borrowing constraint, endogenous labor.
JEL classification: C62, D31, D91, G10.
1 Introduction
Frank Ramsey’s (1928) seminal article on optimal capital accumulation ends
with a famous conjecture: "... equilibrium would be attained by a division into
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two classes, the thrifty enjoying bliss and the improvident at the subsistence
level". In the long run, the most patient agent(s) would hold all the capi-
tal, while the others would consume at the minimum level necessary to sustain
their lives. Becker (1980) demonstrated the Ramsey conjecture in the case of
a stationary equilibrium when households face borrowing constraints. Without
such a constraint, markets are complete and the impatient households would
borrow against the future stream of their labor incomes, consume more in the
present and accept their consumption converges to zero as time tends to infin-
ity (Le Van and Vailakis (2003), and Becker (2012)).1 In contrast, borrowing
constraints result in impatient agents’ positive consumption (equal to wage) at
a steady state.
In the last three decades, the framework introduced by Becker (1980) has
been used for different purposes. For instance, Becker and Foias (1987, 1994) and
Sorger (1994, 1995) prove that persistent cycles of period two as well as chaotic
solutions arise when the capital income monotonicity fails. Under additional
market imperfections (strategic behavior on capital markets and progressive
capital taxation), Becker and Foias (2007), Sarte (1997) or Sorger (2002, 2005,
2008) prove that impatient households may hold capital in the long run. Bosi
and Seegmuller (2010) extend the Ramsey model with heterogeneous households
to endogenous labor.
Our Ramsey model with heterogeneous households, endogenous labor and
borrowing constraints addresses two important issues: the existence of equilib-
rium on the one hand and rational bubbles on the other hand.
To the best of our knowledge, the existence of bubbles has never been con-
sidered in such a context, while the existence of the equilibrium was tackled
only by Becker et al. (1991) and Bosi and Seegmuller (2010). In the latter,
labor supply is endogenous, but the existence of the intertemporal equilibrium
is shown only in a neighborhood of the steady state. Becker et al. (1991) focus
on the model with inelastic labor supply, but provide a global existence argu-
ment. Their proof rests on the introduction of a tâtonnement continuous map
in which each fixed point yields an equilibrium. However, their argument no
longer works when labor is elastically supplied. Our proof of existence holds in
this more general and challenging case and, by the way, a proof of nonexistence
for rational bubbles is also provided.2
1The introduction of a labor-leisure arbitrage implies in addition that impatient agents
work less today to enjoy the leisure time but more tomorrow to repay their debt (Le Van et
al. (2007)).
2To construct this continuous map, the authors require the intertemporal utility to be
continuous for the product topology on the whole space of sequences and the productivity at
the origin larger than the inverse of the time preference (β). In our paper, we only require
the utility to be continuous for the product topology on the feasible set and the productivity
at the origin to be larger than the capital depreciation rate.
However, even if we take the assumptions of Becker et al. (1991) on the utility function
and the productivity, the proof of Becker et al. (1991) can not be carried over our model
under endogenous labor supply. Indeed, their assumptions allow to have the capital per head
bounded away from zero and, since the labor supply is exogenous in their paper, the paths
of capital stock are bounded away from zero. In our paper, since labor supply is endogenous,
labor and capitals are no longer ensured to be bounded away from zero.
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We show the existence of Ramsey equilibrium in three steps. (1) We start by
considering a bounded time-truncated economy and adapting a proof by Floren-
zano (1999) based on the Gale and Mas-Colell’s (1975) fixed-point theorem.3
(2) This solution remains an equilibrium as the uniform bounds are relaxed.
(3) Taking the limit of a sequence of time-truncated economies, we eventually
prove the existence of equilibrium in the infinite-horizon economy. To the best
of our knowledge, there are no papers that prove the existence of equilibrium
under imperfections in the financial markets (borrowing constraint) in the case
of capital accumulation and endogenous labor supply.
Our setup is also suitable to address the important issue of existence of
rational bubbles in a general equilibrium model. The seminal models on the
existence of rational bubbles in a general equilibrium context are overlapping
generations (OG) economies (Tirole (1985)). Financially constrained economies
seem to share some of the same properties found in OG models. In connection
with the Tirole’s (1982) idea that new traders should enter the market each pe-
riod, more recent contributions have shown that bubbles may exist in exchange
economies with heterogeneous infinite-lived households facing some borrowing
constraints (Kocherlakota (1992), Huang and Werner (2000)). Conversely, we
prove that rational bubbles fail to exist when production is taken into account
because of a positive interest rate. Our condition for ruling out any bubble is
less demanding than the one one finds in Kocherlakota (1992) or in Huang and
Werner (2000), that is an endowment growth rate lower than the interest rate.
Section 2 introduces the model. Sections 3 and 4 focus on the definition and
the existence of a Ramsey equilibrium. Sections 5 proves that rational bubbles
never emerge. Technical details are gathered in Appendices 1 to 3.
2 The Ramsey model
The Ramsey equilibrium model specifies the behavior of a finite collection of
households and the profit motive governing production. Each household is
infinitely-lived and enjoys a felicity, or reward, at each time based on its con-
sumption and leisure time. Lifetime utility is the discounted sum of felicities and
each household’s discount factor is a given constant. The production technology
is defined by a one-sector model with a single all purpose consumption-capital
good. Households supply capital goods and labor services to the production
sector at each time. Time is discrete and there is an infinite horizon. Markets
are perfectly competitive and households act with perfect foresight when com-
posing their consumption and investment decisions. Each household’s budget
constraint also reflects a borrowing constraint at each time.
Assumptions governing household behavior and relationships with the pro-
duction sector are detailed below.
3Our proof is quite general and holds even if some initial individual capital endowments
are zero and the capital depreciation rate equals one.
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2.1 The production sector
Consumption goods and new capital goods are produced at each time. The
technology is represented by a constant returns to scale production function:
F (Kt, Lt), where Kt and Lt denote the input demands for capital and labor at
time t. Profit maximization occurs at each time. All intertemporal decisions
reside with households as there are no adjustment costs in the production sector.
Under competition zero profits are earned at each time in this sector. Standard
assumptions are imposed on F as well as a boundary condition when the labor
supply is maximal. This additional condition simplifies the existence argument.
Let R+ = [0,∞) and R
2
+ = R+ ×R+. Let m denote the maximum possible
labor supply within any period. This can occur if each household provides one
unit of labor at each time and there are m households. Note that all labor
services provided by the households are alike.
Assumption 1 The production function F : R2+ → R+ is C
1, homogeneous of
degree one, strictly increasing, concave and strictly concave separately in K > 0
and L > 0. Inputs are essential: F (0, L) = F (K, 0) = 0. Limit conditions for
production hold: F (K,L)→∞ either when L > 0 and K →∞ or when K > 0
and L → ∞. Moreover, (∂F/∂K) (0,m) > δ, where δ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the rate
of capital depreciation.
Remark 1 Since F is homogeneous of degree one and F (1, 0) = 0, we obtain
(∂F/∂K) (∞,m) = 0 and (∂F/∂L) (1,∞) = 0. Indeed,
F (K,mL) ≥ (∂F/∂K) (K,mL)K = (∂F/∂K) (K/L,m)K.
This implies F (1,mL/K) ≥ (∂F/∂K) (K/L,m). Letting K/L go to ∞ yields
0 = F (1, 0) ≥ (∂F/∂K) (∞,m) ≥ 0. The proof that (∂F/∂L) (1,∞) = 0 is left
to the reader.
2.2 Households
We consider an economy without population growth where m households work
and consume. Each household i is endowed with ki0 units of capital at period
0 and one unit of time per period which may be divided between labor supply
and leisure time. The leisure demand of agent i at time t is denoted by λit and
that agent’s labor supply is lit = 1 − λit. This individual’s capital supply and
consumption demands at time t are denoted by kit and cit, respectively. Agents
allocate their income at time t to consumption, cit, and capital accumulation,
denoted kit+1.
The aggregate, or total, initial capital endowment is positive.
Assumption 2 ki0 ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m,
∑
i ki0 > 0.
Each household maximizes a lifetime utility function which is separable over
time:
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui (cit, λit), where βi ∈ (0, 1) is agent i’s discount factor.
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Assumption 3 ui : R
2
+ → R is C
0, strictly increasing and concave. Without
loss of generality, we assume ui(0, 0) = 0 for any i.
For the proof of non-existence of bubbles, the following additional assump-
tion is required.
Assumption 4 (Inada conditions) The utility function is differentiable with
∂ui
∂c
(0, λ) =∞ if λ > 0 and
∂ui
∂λ
(c, 0) =∞ if c > 0
Household heterogeneity can arise in terms of endowments (ki0), discounting
(βi) and per-period utility (ui).
In any period, the household faces a budget constraint:
pt [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit] ≤ rtkit +wt (1− λit)
It is known that, in economies with heterogenous discounting factors and no
borrowing constraints, the more impatient agents borrow, consume more and
work less in the short run than the most patient agents. Over the longer run
those impatient agents consume less and work more in order to repay their debts
to patient agents (see Le Van et al. (2007)). In our model, as in Becker (1980),
agents are prevented from borrowing: kit ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m and t = 1, 2, . . .
This constraint implies the model has an incomplete market structure as no
markets exist where agents can borrow against their future wage income in
order to consume more today.
3 Definition of equilibrium
Let an infinite-horizon sequences of prices and quantities be denoted by:
(p, r,w, (ci,ki,λi)
m
i=1 ,K,L) ,
where
(p, r,w) ≡ ((pt)
∞
t=0 , (rt)
∞
t=0 , (wt)
∞
t=0) ∈ R
∞ × R∞+ ×R
∞
+ ;
(ci,ki,λi) ≡ ((cit)
∞
t=0 , (kit)
∞
t=1 , (λit)
∞
t=0) ∈ R
∞
+ ×R
∞ ×R∞+ ;
(K,L) ≡ ((Kt)
∞
t=0 , (Lt)
∞
t=0) ∈ R
∞
+ ×R
∞
+ ,
with i = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 1 A Walrasian equilibrium
(
p¯, r¯, w¯,
(
c¯i, k¯i, λ¯i
)m
i=1
, K¯, L¯
)
satisfies
the following conditions.
(1) Price positivity: p¯t, r¯t, w¯t > 0 for t = 0, 1, . . .
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(2) Market clearing:
goods :
m∑
i=1
[
c¯it + k¯it+1 − (1− δ) k¯it
]
= F
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
;
capital : K¯t =
m∑
i=1
k¯it;
labor : L¯t =
m∑
i=1
l¯it,
for t = 0, 1, . . ., where lit = 1− λit denotes the individual labor supply.
(3) Optimal production plans: p¯tF
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
− r¯tK¯t− w¯tL¯t is the value of the
program: max [p¯tF (Kt, Lt)− r¯tKt − w¯tLt], under the constraints Kt ≥ 0 and
Lt ≥ 0 for t = 0, 1, . . ..
(4) Optimal consumption plans:
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
is the value of the pro-
gram: max
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui (cit, λit), under the following constraints:
budget constraint : p¯t [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit] ≤ r¯tkit + w¯t (1− λit)
borrowing constraint : kit+1 ≥ 0
leisure endowment : 0 ≤ λit ≤ 1
capital endowment : ki0 ≥ 0 given
for t = 0, 1, . . .
The following observation is a critical feature of our economic model.
Remark 2 Under Assumption 1, individual and aggregate capital supplies, in-
dividual and aggregate consumption demands are uniformly bounded. Labor sup-
ply is uniformly bounded by m.
Let A denote the common bound of the feasible consumption and capital
stocks sequences.
Let us prove now the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium. The proof will be
articulated in two parts. First, we consider an equilibrium with a finite horizon.
Then, we let the horizon go to infinity to obtain a Walrasian equilibrium as
limit of a sequence of finite-horizon economies.
4 Existence of equilibrium
Our main result is the existence of an equilibrium for this heterogeneous agent
capital accumulation economy. The proof is given in two major steps. First,
we prove the existence of equilibrium in finite-horizon economies. This demon-
stration has two parts: an existence theorem with an artificial bound on agents
choice sets, and an extension of this theorem when those bounds are relaxed.
The last step proves an equilibrium exists in the infinite-horizon economy. That
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economy is viewed as a limit of a sequence of truncated economies; the infinite
horizon equilibrium prices and quantities are naturally shown to be limits of
their finite horizon counterparts.
Consider a finite-horizon bounded economy which goes on for T +1 periods:
t = 0, . . . , T . Choose sufficiently large quantity bounds Bc, Bk, and so on,
with:
Xi ≡ {(ci0, . . . , ciT ) : 0 ≤ cit ≤ Bc} = [0, Bc]
T+1 ;
Yi ≡ {(ki1, . . . , kiT ) : 0 ≤ kit ≤ Bk} = [0, Bk]
T
;
Zi ≡ {(λi0, . . . , λiT ) : 0 ≤ λit ≤ 1} = [0, 1]
T+1 ;
Y ≡ {(K0, . . . ,KT ) : 0 ≤ Kt ≤ BK} = [0, BK ]
T+1
;
Z ≡ {(L0, . . . , LT ) : 0 ≤ Lt ≤ BL} = [0, BL]
T+1 ,
where mBk < BK , m < BL, m (1− δ)Bk + F (BK , BL) < Bc. Recall that
ki0 is given and that the borrowing constraint inequalities kit ≥ 0 model the
imperfection in the credit market.4
Let ET denote this bounded economy with technology and preferences
as in Assumptions 1 to 3. Let Xi, Yi and Zi be the ith consumer-worker’s
bounded sets for consumption demand, capital supply and leisure demand re-
spectively (i = 1, . . . ,m). The sets Y and Z are the bounded sets constraining
the production sector’s capital and labor demands at each time.
Theorem 3 Under the Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, there exists an equilibrium(
p¯, r¯, w¯,
(
c¯h, k¯h, λ¯h
)m
h=1
, K¯, L¯
)
for the finite-horizon bounded economy ET .
Proof. See Appendix 1.
The unbounded economy, with relaxed artificial bounds, is shown to pos-
sess an equilibrium price system and allocation.
Corollary 1 Any equilibrium of ET is an equilibrium for the finite-horizon un-
bounded economy.
Proof. The standard argument applies given the existence of an equilibrium
for the bounded economy.
Our main result is the following existence theorem for the infinite-horizon
economy.
Theorem 4 Under the Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, there exists an equilibrium
in the infinite-horizon economy with endogenous labor supply and borrowing
constraints.
Proof. We consider a sequence of time-truncated economies and the associated
equilibria. We prove that there exists a sequence of equilibria which converges,
when the horizon T goes to infinity, to an equilibrium of the infinite-horizon
economy. Appendix 2 contains the formal proof.
4The credit constraint might be generalized by requiring: hi ≤ kit with hi < 0 given. This
specification is left for another paper.
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5 Non-existence of bubbles
There is considerable interest in whether or not a perfect foresight equilibrium
capital asset price sequence is consistent with the notion of a rational pricing
bubble. Some researchers points out that bubbles may occur with heterogeneous
infinite-lived households facing borrowing constraints in an exchange economy
(Kocherlakota (1992), Huang and Werner (2000)). We show this does not carry
over to a model with productive capital accumulation.
Let
(
p¯, r¯, w¯,
(
c¯i, k¯i, λ¯i
)m
i=1
, K¯, L¯
)
denote an equilibrium in the infinite hori-
zon economy. We will take p¯t = 1 for any t. We know that, for any t, r¯t > 0
and w¯t > 0.
Claim 5 Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Inada), we have:
(1) c¯it > 0 if and only if λ¯it > 0,
(2) for any i and any t, c¯it > 0 and λ¯it > 0,
(3) for any i and any t,
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
≥ (1− δ + r¯t+1)βi
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it+1, λ¯it+1
)
and, if k¯it+1 > 0, then
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
= (1− δ + r¯t+1)βi
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it+1, λ¯it+1
)
,
(4) for any i and any t,
w¯t
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
≤
∂ui
∂λ
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
(1)
and, if λ¯it < 1, then
w¯t
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
=
∂ui
∂λ
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
(5) Finally, K¯t, L¯t > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Now define:
q¯t+1≡max
i
βi (∂ui/∂c)
(
c¯it+1, λ¯it+1
)
(∂ui/∂c)
(
c¯it, λ¯it
) = 1
1− δ + r¯t+1
The ratio q¯t has a natural interpretation as a market discount factor. The
maximum condition on the right-hand side (above) shows that this ratio reflects
the marginal rate of substitution between t and t + 1 for the highest marginal
valuation consumer.
Let
Q¯0 ≡ 1 (2)
Q¯t ≡
t∏
s=1
q¯s for t > 0 (3)
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Clearly, Q¯t =
∏t
s=1 (1− δ + r¯s)
−1
for t > 0. Q¯t is the present value of a
unit of capital of period t with focal date t = 0. This present value is implic-
itly defined via the current value prices system that arises as an equilibrium
configuration in our main theorem. For any t, we obtain:
Q¯t = Q¯t+1 (1− δ + r¯t+1) (4)
and, by induction, 1 = Q¯0 = Q¯T (1− δ)
T +
∑T
t=1 Q¯tr¯t (1− δ)
t−1.
We define below the fundamental value of capital considered as a long-lived
asset with focal date t = 0. At date 1, one unit of this asset will give back 1− δ
unit of capital and r¯1 unit of consumption good as its dividend. At period 2,
1− δ unit of capital will give back (1− δ)2 unit of capital and (1− δ) r¯2 as its
dividend. This leads to the following definition of the Fundamental Value of
capital:
FV ≡
∞∑
t=1
Q¯t (1− δ)
t−1
r¯t
Given that the price of capital at t = 0 is expected, with our normalizations,
to be 1 if capital is priced in an efficient market (i.e. the present value of a unit
of capital is its present value of future rental rates), we say there is a bubble if
FV = 1− limT→∞ Q¯T (1− δ)
T < 1. More formally:
Definition 2 The economy is said to experience a bubble if
lim
T→∞
Q¯T (1− δ)
T > 0
Otherwise (limT→∞ Q¯T (1− δ)
T = 0), there is no bubble.
The crucial question concerns the existence of bubbles in a productive econ-
omy. We show that a productive economy experiences no bubbles. The proof
rests on the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If the economy experiences a bubble, then r¯t converges to zero.
Proof. It is equivalent to prove that, if r¯t does not converge to zero, there are
no bubbles. If r¯t does not converge to zero, there are, equivalently, ρ > 0 and a
strictly increasing sequence (ti)
∞
i=1 such that r¯ti ≥ ρ for i = 1, 2, . . . For T > tn,
we get
Q¯T (1− δ)
T =
T∏
s=1
1− δ
1− δ + r¯s
≤
n∏
i=1
1− δ
1− δ + r¯ti
≤
(
1− δ
1− δ+ρ
)n
and
0 ≤ lim sup
T→∞
Q¯T (1− δ)
T
≤ lim
n→∞
(
1− δ
1− δ+ρ
)n
= 0
Now, we are able to prove the No-Bubble Theorem.
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Theorem 6 Under the Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, our productive economy
experiences no bubble.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Remark 7 We have for any t and any i(
Q¯tc¯it + Q¯tw¯tλ¯it
)
+ Q¯tk¯it+1 = Q¯tw¯t + Q¯t (1− δ + r¯t) k¯it
If we consider the capital as a long-lived asset, we can consider the sequence
of perfectly foreseen equilibrium wages at each time, w¯t, as if it is agent i’s
endogenously determined labor income present value or endowment. Summing
from t = 0 to t = T , we get:
T∑
t=0
Q¯t
(
c¯it + w¯tλ¯it
)
+ Q¯T k¯iT+1 =
T∑
t=0
Q¯tw¯t + Q¯0 (1− δ + r¯0) k¯i0
Following Huang and Werner (2000) among others, we may say that, when
the interest rate is high, in the sense that
∑T
t=0 Q¯tw¯t < ∞, then there is no
bubble. Indeed, if this property holds and if (w¯t) ∈ int l∞+ , then
∑T
t=0 Q¯t < ∞
which implies limt Q¯t = 0 and we have no bubble. However, here, we do not
know, without additional assumptions, that (w¯t) ∈ int l∞+ and
∑T
t=0 Q¯tw¯t <∞.
5
Nevertheless, no bubble holds in our economy.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the existence of the intertemporal equilibrium and the occur-
rence rational bubbles in a Ramsey model with heterogeneous agents, borrowing
constraints and endogenous labor.
The assumed market incompleteness from the borrowing constraint nullifies
the equivalence between the planner’s and the market solution characteristic
of the complete markets modeling framework. For this reason, nonstandard
fixed-point arguments are needed to prove the existence of a Ramsey equilib-
rium. Assuming borrowing constraints are the financial market imperfection
in our model economy, we adopt a three-pronged proof strategy: existence in
a (1) bounded and, then, (2) an unbounded truncated economy, and, last, (3)
existence in an infinite-horizon economy as limit of a sequence of truncated un-
bounded economies. Moreover, as a by-product of our proof we demonstrate
that bubbles cannot exist despite the presence of borrowing constraints because
equilibrium interest-rental rates are positive.
Therefore, this paper adds to the existing Ramsey equilibrium literature on
two fronts. We provide a simple general proof of existence of an equilibrium
(because of the endogenous labor supply and the weaker assumptions on the
fundamentals); on the other hand, our arguments also furnish a proof that
bubbles are nonexistent in a productive economy.
5Here, we consider the interior intl∞
+
when l∞ is endowed with the supnorm topology.
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7 Appendix 1: existence of equilibrium in a finite-
horizon economy
The proof of Theorem 3 requires some ingredients which are given below.
Define a bounded price set P ≡ △T+1 with the simplex
△ ≡ {(p, r, w) : p, r, w ≥ 0, p+ r +w = 1}
Focus now on the budget constraints: pt [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit] ≤ rtkit +
wt (1− λit) for t = 0, . . . , T with kiT+1 = 0.
Consider the budget set:
CTi (p, r,w)
≡

(ci,ki,λi) ∈ Xi × Yi × Zi :
pt [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit] ≤ rtkit +wt (1− λit)
t = 0, . . . , T

and its interior
BTi (p, r,w)
≡

(ci,ki,λi) ∈ Xi × Yi × Zi :
pt [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit] < rtkit +wt (1− λit)
t = 0, . . . , T

We denote by B¯Ti (p, r,w) the closure of B
T
i (p, r,w). It is obvious that,
when BTi (p, r,w) = ∅, then C
T
i (p, r,w) = B¯
T
i (p, r,w). Nonemptiness of B
T
i
is crucial for the existence of demands.
The following result is very useful for our proof of existence of a Walrasian
equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, if w0 > 0 and rt + wt > 0, for
t = 1, . . . , T , then the set BTi (p, r,w) is nonempty.
Proof. Take ki1 > 0 and λi0 < 1 such that p0ki1 < w0 (1− λi0) ≤ r0ki0 +
w0(1 − λi0). Take ki2 > 0, λi1 < 1 such that p1ki2 ≤ r1ki1 + w1 (1− λi1) and
so on.
Observe that when δ = 1, the set BTi (p, r,w) is empty if rt = wt = 0 and
pt = 1 for some t and, when ki0 = 0, this set is empty if p0 = w0 = 0 and r0 = 1.
For that reason, at the beginning, we introduce the following sets.
Let ε > 0 satisfym (1− δ) (Bk + ε)+F (BK , BL)+mε < Bc andmBk+mε <
11
BK . We define:
CTεi (p, r,w)
≡

(ci,ki,λi) ∈ Xi × Yi × Zi :
pt [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit] ≤ ptε+ pt (1− δ) ε+ rt (kit + ε) +wt (1− λit)
t = 0, . . . , T

BTεi (p, r,w)
≡

(ci,ki,λi) ∈ Xi × Yi × Zi :
pt [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit] < ptε+ pt (1− δ) ε+ rt (kit + ε) +wt (1− λit)
t = 0, . . . , T

Remark 8 ε represents a perturbation of the fundamental economy. In the ε-
economy, the firm uses ε as an additional input. ε and kit are the same capital
good and experiences the same depreciation during the production process. When
the process ends, they are resold at the same price pt to earn pt (1− δ) (ε+ kit).
The next lemma plays a critical role. The perturbation of the fundamental
economy yields that each agent has a positive income at each time. As in
standard competitive equilibrium proofs for finite exchange and/or production
economies, this is required to show all agents are, in fact, finding their utility
maximizing bundles subject to a budget constraint (the cheaper point property
in standard equilibrium theories).
Lemma 3 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the set BTεi (p, r,w) is nonempty
and CTεi (p, r,w) = B¯
Tε
i (p, r,w). Moreover the correspondence B
Tε
i is lower
semicontinuous (lsc).
Proof. Take λit = η < 1, kit+1 = 0, cit = 0. Then, ptε + pt (1− δ) ε +
rt (ε+ kit) +wt (1− λit) > 0 for any (pt, rt, wt) ∈ △ and, hence,
α ≡ min
(p,r,w)∈△
[pε+ p (1− δ) ε+ rε+w (1− η)] > 0
We have
pt [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit] = −pt (1− δ) kit ≤ 0 < α
≤ ptε+ pt (1− δ) ε+ rt(ε+ kit) +wt(1− λit)
for any t. So, BTεi (p, r,w) is non empty. The proof of the remaining assertions
is easy.
The following lemma is crucial for the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 4 Under the Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, there exists(
p¯ (ε) , r¯ (ε) , w¯ (ε) ,
(
c¯i (ε) , k¯i (ε) , λ¯i (ε)
)m
i=1
, K¯ (ε) , L¯ (ε)
)
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in the finite-horizon bounded economy ET which satisfies:
(1) price positivity: p¯t (ε) , r¯t (ε) , w¯t (ε) > 0 for t = 0, . . . , T ,
(2) market clearing:
goods :
m∑
i=1
[
c¯it (ε) + k¯it+1 (ε)− (1− δ) k¯it (ε)
]
= F
(
K¯t (ε) , L¯t (ε)
)
+mε+m (1− δ) ε
capital : K¯t (ε) =
m∑
i=1
k¯it (ε) +mε
labor : L¯t (ε) =
m∑
i=1
l¯it (ε)
for t = 0, . . . , T , where l¯it (ε) = 1− λ¯it (ε) denotes the individual labor supply.
(3) Optimal production plans: p¯t(ε)F
(
K¯t(ε), L¯t(ε)
)
− r¯t(ε)K¯t(ε)− w¯tL¯t(ε)
is the value of the program: max [p¯t(ε)F (Kt, Lt)− r¯t(ε)Kt − w¯t(ε)Lt], under
the constraints K¯ ∈ Y and L¯ ∈ Z for t = 0, . . . , T . Moreover,
p¯t(ε)F
(
K¯t(ε), L¯t(ε)
)
− r¯t(ε)K¯t(ε)− w¯tL¯t(ε) = 0
(4) Optimal consumption plans:
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui
(
c¯it(ε), λ¯it(ε)
)
is the value of the
program: max
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui (cit, λit), under the following constraints:
p¯t (ε) (cit + kit+1) ≤ p¯t (ε) ε+ [p¯t (ε) (1− δ) + r¯t(ε)] (kit + ε) + w¯t(ε) (1− λit)
c¯i ∈ Xi, k¯i ∈ Yi, λ¯it ∈ [0, 1], ki0 ≥ 0 given
for t = 0, . . . , T .
Proof. In the spirit of Florenzano (1999), we introduce the reaction cor-
respondences ϕi (p, r,w, (ch,kh,λh)
m
h=1 ,K,L), i = 0, . . . ,m + 1 defined on
P × [×mh=1 (Xh × Yh × Zh)]×Y ×Z, where i = 0 denotes an "additional" agent,
i = 1, . . . ,m the consumers, and i = m+1 the firm. These correspondences are
defined as follows.
Agent i = 0 (the "additional" agent):
ϕ0 (p, r,w, (ch,kh,λh)
m
h=1 ,K,L) ≡
(p˜, r˜, w˜) ∈ P :∑T
t=0 (p˜t − pt) (
∑
i [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit]−mε−m (1− δ) ε− F (Kt, Lt))
+
∑T
t=0 (r˜t − rt) (Kt −mε−
∑m
i=1 kit)
+
∑T
t=0 (w˜t −wt) (Lt −m+
∑m
i=1 λit) > 0

(5)
Agents i = 1, . . . ,m (consumers-workers):
ϕi (p, r,w, (ch,kh,λh)
m
h=1 ,K,L) ≡{
BTεi (p, r,w) if (ci,ki,λi) /∈ C
Tε
i (p, r,w)
BTεi (p, r,w) ∩ [Pi (ci,λi)× Yi] if (ci,ki,λi) ∈ C
Tε
i (p, r,w)
}
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where Pi is the ith agent’s set of strictly preferred allocations: Pi (ci,λi) ≡{(
c˜i, λ˜i
)
:
∑T
t=0 β
t
iui
(
c˜it, λ˜it
)
>
∑T
t=0 β
t
iui (cit, λit)
}
.
Agent i = m+ 1 (the firm):
ϕm+1 (p, r,w, (ch,kh,λh)
m
h=1 ,K,L) ≡
(
K˜, L˜
)
∈ Y × Z :∑T
t=0
[
ptF
(
K˜t, L˜t
)
− rtK˜t −wtL˜t
]
>
∑T
t=0 [ptF (Kt, Lt)− rtKt −wtLt]
 (6)
We observe that ϕi : Φ→ 2
Φi where
Φ ≡ Φ0 × . . .× Φm+1
Φ0 ≡ P
Φi ≡ Xi × Yi × Zi, i = 1, . . . ,m
Φm+1 ≡ Y × Z
and 2Φi denotes the set of subsets of Φi.
ϕi is a lower semicontinuous convex-valued correspondence for i = 0, . . . ,m+
1.
Let us simplify the notation
v ≡ (p, r,w, (ci,ki,λi)
m
i=1 ,K,L)
v0 ≡ (p, r,w)
vi ≡ (ci,ki,λi) for i = 1, . . . ,m
vm+1 ≡ (K,L)
We observe the following.
(1) By definition of ϕ0 (the inequality in (5) is strict): (p, r,w) /∈ ϕ0 (v).
(2) (ci,ki,λi) /∈ Pi (ci,λi) × Yi implies that (ci,ki,λi) /∈ ϕi (v) for i =
1, . . . ,m.
(3) By definition of ϕm+1 (the inequality in (6) is also strict): (K,L) /∈
ϕm+1 (v).
Then, for i = 0, . . . ,m+ 1, vi /∈ ϕi (v).
Apply Gale and Mas-Colell (1975) fixed-point theorem. There exists v¯ ∈ Φ
such that ϕi (v¯) = ∅ for i = 0, . . . ,m+ 1, that is, there exists v¯ ∈ Φ such that
the following holds.
Focus on "agent" i = 0. For every (p, r,w) ∈ P ,
T∑
t=0
(pt − p¯t)
(
m∑
i=1
[
c¯it + k¯it+1 − (1− δ) k¯it
]
−mε−m (1− δ) ε− F
(
K¯t, L¯t
))
+
T∑
t=0
(rt − r¯t)
(
K¯t −mε−
m∑
i=1
k¯it
)
+
T∑
t=0
(wt − w¯t)
(
L¯t −m+
m∑
i=1
λ¯it
)
≤ 0 (7)
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Consider i = 1, . . . ,m.
(
c¯i, k¯i, λ¯i
)
∈ CTεi (p¯, r¯, w¯) and B
Tε
i (p¯, r¯, w¯) ∩[
Pi
(
c¯i, λ¯i
)
× Yi
]
= ∅ for i = 1, . . . ,m. Then, for i = 1, . . . ,m, (ci,ki,λi) ∈
CTεi (p¯, r¯, w¯) = B
Tε
i (p¯, r¯, w¯) implies
T∑
t=0
βtiui (cit, λit) ≤
T∑
t=0
βtiui
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
(8)
Focus on the firm i =m+1. For t = 0, . . . , T and for every (K,L) ∈ Y×Z, we
have
∑T
t=0 [p¯tF (Kt, Lt)− r¯tKt − w¯tLt] ≤
∑T
t=0
[
p¯tF
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
− r¯tK¯t − w¯tL¯t
]
.
This is possible if and only if
p¯tF (Kt, Lt)− r¯tKt − w¯tLt ≤ p¯tF
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
− r¯tK¯t − w¯tL¯t (9)
for any t. In particular, the equilibrium profit is nonnegative.
p¯tF
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
− r¯tK¯t − w¯tL¯t ≥ 0 (10)
Let us show that p¯t > 0.
First, we have from the budget constraints:
p¯t
∑
i
[
c¯it + k¯it+1 − (1− δ) k¯it
]
≤ mp¯tε+mp¯t (1− δ) ε+mr¯tε+ r¯t
∑
i
k¯it + w¯t
∑
i
(1− λ¯it)
Combining with (10), we get
0 ≥ p¯t
(∑
i
[
c¯it + k¯it+1 − (1− δ) k¯it
]
− F
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
−m (1− δ) ε−mε
)
+r¯t
(
K¯t −mε−
∑
i
k¯it
)
+ w¯t
(
L¯t −
∑
i
(
1− λ¯it
))
(11)
Combining (7) with (11), we find
0 ≥
T∑
t=0
pt
(∑
i
[
c¯it + k¯it+1 − (1− δ) k¯it
]
− F
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
−m (1− δ) ε−mε
)
+
T∑
t=0
rt
(
K¯t −mε−
∑
i
k¯it
)
+
T∑
t=0
wt
(
L¯t −
∑
i
(
1− λ¯it
))
(12)
and, noticing that (12) holds for any (p, r,w) ∈ P ,
K¯t −mε−
∑
i
k¯it ≤ 0 (13)
L¯t −
∑
i
(
1− λ¯it
)
≤ 0 (14)∑
i
[
c¯it + k¯it+1 − (1− δ) k¯it
]
− F
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
−m (1− δ) ε−mε ≤ 0 (15)
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Observe that (15) implies∑
i
c¯it ≤ (1− δ)mBk + F (BK , BL) +m (1− δ) ε+mε < Bc (16)
Suppose p¯t = 0. From the consumers’ problem, we obtain c¯it = Bc and
λ¯it = 1 for any i. That is a contradiction with (16). Hence, p¯t > 0.
We want to prove now that, for any t,
p¯tF
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
− r¯tK¯t − w¯tL¯t = 0 (17)
and r¯t > 0, w¯t > 0.
From (13) and (14), we have K¯t ≤ mε +mBk < BK and L¯t ≤ m < BL.
Suppose p¯tF
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
−r¯tK¯t−w¯tL¯t = π > 0. Choose µ > 1 such that µK¯t < BK
and µL¯t < BL. We have
p¯tF
(
µK¯t, µL¯t
)
− r¯tµK¯t − w¯tµL¯t = µπ > π = p¯tF
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
− r¯tK¯t − w¯tL¯t
which is a contradiction to (9).
Assume r¯t = 0. Then, we have 0 ≥ p¯tF (K,L)−w¯tL for any (K,L) ∈ Y ×Z.
Take 0 < K < BK and 0 < L < BL. We obtain 0 ≥ L [p¯tF (K/L, 1)− w¯t].
Since p¯t > 0 and limL→0 F (K/L, 1) = ∞, we have [p¯tF (K/L, 1)− w¯t] > 0
when L is sufficiently close to 0, leading to a contradiction.
The proof that w¯t > 0 is similar.
Let us show now that
K¯t −mε−
∑
i
k¯it = 0
L¯t −
∑
i
(
1− λ¯it
)
= 0∑
i
[
c¯it + k¯it+1 − (1− δ) k¯it
]
− F
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
−m (1− δ) ε−mε = 0
Since p¯t > 0 the budget constraints bind. Combining with (13), (14), (15)
and (17), we obtain
mp¯tε+mp¯t (1− δ) ε+mr¯tε+ r¯t
∑
i
k¯it + w¯t
∑
i
(
1− λ¯it
)
= p¯t
∑
i
[
c¯it + k¯it+1 − (1− δ) k¯it
]
≤ p¯t
[
F
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
+m (1− δ) ε+mε
]
= r¯tK¯t + w¯tL¯t + p¯tm (1− δ) ε+ p¯tmε
≤ mp¯tε+mp¯t (1− δ) ε+mr¯tε+ r¯t
∑
i
k¯it + w¯t
∑
i
(
1− λ¯it
)
Hence
p¯t
∑
i
[
c¯it + k¯it+1 − (1− δ) k¯it
]
= p¯t
[
F
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
+m (1− δ) ε+mε
]
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and
r¯t
(
K¯t −mε−
∑
i
k¯it
)
+ w¯t
[
L¯t −
∑
i
(
1− λ¯it
)]
= 0 (18)
Since p¯t > 0, we have∑
i
[
c¯it + k¯it+1 − (1− δ) k¯it
]
− F
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
−m (1− δ) ε−mε = 0
Since r¯t > 0, w¯t > 0 and (18) holds, inequalities (13) and (14) become
K¯t −mε−
∑
i
k¯it = 0 and L¯t −
∑
i
(
1− λ¯it
)
= 0
The proof of Lemma 4 is now complete.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Keeping in mind these results, we now prove Theorem 3. We let ε
converge to 0. We denote the allocations and the prices obtained in Lemma 4
by (
p¯ (ε) , r¯ (ε) , w¯ (ε) ,
(
c¯i (ε) , k¯i (ε) , λ¯i (ε)
)m
i=1
, K¯ (ε) , L¯ (ε)
)
We recall that, for any t, p¯t (ε) + r¯t (ε) + w¯t (ε) = 1. Denote(
p¯, r¯, w¯,
(
c¯i, k¯i, λ¯i
)m
i=1
, K¯, L¯
)
≡ lim
ε→0
(
p¯ (ε) , r¯ (ε) , w¯ (ε) ,
(
c¯i (ε) , k¯i (ε) , λ¯i (ε)
)m
i=1
, K¯ (ε) , L¯ (ε)
)
For any t and any (Kt, Lt) ∈ Y × Z, we have
0 = p¯tF
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
− r¯tK¯t − w¯tL¯t ≥ p¯tF (Kt, Lt)− r¯tKt − w¯tLt
K¯0 =
∑
i ki0 > 0 and L¯0 ≤ m < BL.
Let us show that w¯0 > 0 and r¯t + w¯t > 0, for t = 1, . . . , T .
If w¯0 = 0 and p¯0 > 0 we have
0 = p¯0F
(
K¯0, L¯0
)
− r¯0K¯0 ≥ p¯0F (K0, L0)− r¯0K0 (19)
for any (K0, L0) ∈ Y × Z. Take K0 = ǫ > 0 and L0 = L ∈ (0, BL). We obtain
a contradiction:
0 ≥ p¯0F (ǫ, L)− r¯0ǫ = [p¯0F (1, L/ǫ)− r¯0] ǫ > 0
when ǫ goes to zero since F (1,∞) = ∞. Hence w¯0 = 0 implies p¯0 = 0 and
r¯0 = 1 (because of the unit simplex). However, from (19), K¯0 = 0 which is
impossible.
Assume that w¯t = 0 for some t ≥ 1. The same argument previously used
implies p¯t = 0 and r¯t = 1.
Assume r¯t = 0 for some t ≥ 1 and p¯t > 0. Then,
0 ≥ p¯tF (Kt, Lt)− w¯tLt
17
for any (Kt, Lt) ∈ Y × Z. Take Kt = K ∈ (0, BK) and Lt = ǫ > 0. We obtain
a contradiction
0 ≥ p¯tF (K, ǫ)− w¯tǫ = [p¯tF (K/ǫ, 1)− w¯t] ǫ > 0
when ǫ becomes sufficiently close to zero, since F (∞, 1) = ∞. Hence r¯t = 0
implies p¯t = 0 and w¯t = 1.
From Lemma 2, the set BTi (p¯, r¯, w¯) is nonempty. Taking (ci,ki,λi) ∈
BTi (p¯, r¯, w¯), we have
p¯t
[
c¯it + k¯it+1 − (1− δ) k¯it
]
< r¯tk¯it + w¯t
(
1− λ¯it
)
for any t. There exists ε¯ > 0 such that for any ε < ε¯, we have for any t,
p¯t (ε)
[
c¯it (ε) + k¯it+1 (ε)− (1− δ) k¯it (ε)
]
< r¯t (ε) k¯it (ε) + w¯t (ε)
[
1− λ¯it (ε)
]
< p¯t (ε) ε+ p¯t (ε) (1− δ) ε+ r¯t (ε) ε
+r¯t (ε) k¯it (ε) + w¯t (ε)
[
1− λ¯it (ε)
]
Therefore,
∑T
t=0 β
t
iui (cit, λit) ≤
∑T
t=0 β
t
iui
(
c¯it (ε) , λ¯it (ε)
)
. Let ε go to 0.
Then
∑T
t=0 β
t
iui (cit, λit) ≤
∑T
t=0 β
t
iui
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
. Let (ci,ki,λi) ∈ C
T
i (p¯, r¯, w¯).
There exists a sequence (cni ,k
n
i ,λ
n
i )
∞
n=1 ⊂ B
T
i (p¯, r¯, w¯) which converges to
(ci,ki,λi). For any n, we have
T∑
t=0
βtiui (c
n
it, λ
n
it) ≤
T∑
t=0
βtiui
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
Let n go to ∞. Then
∑T
t=0 β
t
iui (cit, λit) ≤
∑T
t=0 β
t
iui
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
. The prices
(p¯t, w¯t) are strictly positive since the utility functions ui are strictly increasing.
The price r¯t is strictly positive since we have proved above that r¯t = 0 implies
p¯t = 0.
It is easy to check that the list
(
p¯, r¯, w¯,
(
c¯i, k¯i, λ¯i
)m
i=1
, K¯, L¯
)
is an equilib-
rium for the T + 1-horizon economy.
8 Appendix 2: existence of equilibrium in an
infinite-horizon economy
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We will denote by(
p¯ (T ) , r¯ (T ) , w¯ (T ) ,
(
c¯i (T ) , k¯i (T ) , λ¯i (T )
)m
i=1
, K¯ (T ) , L¯ (T )
)
an equilibrium for the T + 1-horizon economy and(
pˆ, rˆ, wˆ,
(
cˆi, kˆi, λˆi
)m
i=1
, Kˆ, Lˆ
)
≡ lim
T→∞
(
p¯ (T ) , r¯ (T ) , w¯ (T ) ,
(
c¯i (T ) , k¯i (T ) , λ¯i (T )
)m
i=1
, K¯ (T ) , L¯ (T )
)
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for the product topology.
We claim that wˆ0 > 0, wˆt + rˆt > 0 for any t ≥ 1. Indeed, we always have
0 = pˆ0F
(
Kˆ0, Lˆ0
)
− wˆ0Lˆ0 − rˆ0Kˆ0 ≥ pˆ0F (K,L)− wˆ0L− rˆ0K
for any (K,L) ∈ R2+.
If wˆ0 = 0 and pˆ0 > 0, then 0 ≥ pˆ0F (K,L)− rˆ0K for any (K,L) ∈ R2+. Take
K > 0 and let L go to infinity to get a contradiction. Hence wˆ0 = 0 implies
pˆ0 = 0 and rˆ0 = 1. In this case we will have Kˆ0 = 0 which is impossible since
Kˆ0 =
∑
i ki0 > 0. We conclude that wˆ0 > 0.
Assume wˆt = 0 and pˆt > 0 for some t ≥ 1. Then 0 ≥ pˆtF (K,L)− rˆtK for
any (K,L) ∈ R2+. Take K > 0 and let L go to infinity to have a contradiction.
Now assume rˆt = 0 and pˆt > 0 for some t ≥ 1. Then 0 ≥ pˆtF (K,L)− wˆtL for
any (K,L) ∈ R2+. Take L > 0 and let K go to infinity: a contradiction arises.
Then, rˆt + wˆt > 0 for any t. From Lemma 2, for any τ ≥ 1, the set Bτi (pˆ, rˆ, wˆ)
is non empty. Fix some τ ≥ 1. Take (cit, kit+1, λit)
τ
t=0 ∈ B
τ
i (pˆ, rˆ, wˆ). We have
pˆt [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit] < rˆtkit + wˆt (1− λit)
for t = 0, . . . , τ . There exists N > τ such that, for any T ≥ N ,
p¯t (T ) [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit] < r¯t (T ) kit + w¯t (T ) (1− λit)
for t = 0, . . . , τ . Take T ≥ N . Define
(
c˜it (T ) , k˜it+1 (T ) , λ˜it (T )
)T
t=0
by c˜it(T ) =
cit, k˜it+1(T ) = kit+1 and λ˜it(T ) = λit for t = 0, . . . , τ , and c˜it(T ) = k˜it+1(T ) =
λ˜it(T ) = 0 for t = τ + 1, . . . , T . Obviously, (c˜it(T ), k˜it+1(T ), λ˜it(T ))Tt=0 ∈
CTi (p¯(T), r¯(T), w¯(T)). Hence
τ∑
t=0
βtiui (cit, λit) =
T∑
t=0
βtiui(c˜it, λ˜it) ≤
T∑
t=0
βtiui
(
c¯it(T ), λ¯it(T )
)
This implies
τ∑
t=0
βtiui (cit, λit) ≤ lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
βtiui
(
c¯it (T ) , λ¯it (T )
)
=
∞∑
t=0
βtiui
(
cˆit, λˆit
)
(20)
Now let (cit, kit+1, λit)
∞
t=0 ∈ R
∞
+ ×R
∞
+ × [0, 1]
∞ satisfy:
pˆt [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit] ≤ rˆtkit + wˆt (1− λit)
for t = 0, . . . ,∞. In this case, (cit, kit+1, λit)
τ
t=0 ∈ C
τ
i (pˆ, rˆ, wˆ). There exists a
sequence
((
cnit, k
n
it+1, λ
n
it
)τ
t=0
)
n
⊂ Bτi (pˆ, rˆ, wˆ) converging to (cit, kit+1, λit)
τ
t=0.
We then have, from (20):
τ∑
t=0
βtiui (c
n
it, λ
n
it) ≤
∞∑
t=0
βtiui
(
cˆit, λˆit
)
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Let n go to ∞:
∑τ
t=0 β
t
iui (cit, λit) ≤
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui
(
cˆit, λˆit
)
. Let τ go to ∞:∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui (cit, λit) ≤
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui
(
cˆit, λˆit
)
. We have proved that
(
cˆ, λˆ
)
solves
the consumer’s problem in the infinite-horizon economy. The prices (pˆt, wˆt) are
strictly positive thanks to the strict increasingness of the utility functions. The
price rˆt > 0 since we have proved rˆt = 0 implies pˆt = 0.
It is now easy to check that the list
(
pˆ, rˆ, wˆ,
(
cˆi, kˆi, λˆi
)m
i=1
, Kˆ, Lˆ
)
is an
equilibrium for the infinite-horizon economy.
9 Appendix 3: non-existence of bubbles
Proof of Claim 5
Proof. (1) c¯it + w¯tλ¯it + k¯it+1 = (1− δ + r¯t) k¯it + w¯t. Suppose c¯it > 0 and
λ¯it = 0. By Assumption 4, we can decrease c¯it and increase λ¯it to have a
higher utility for period t. Hence λ¯it > 0. The converse is proved by the same
argument.
(2) We first prove that c¯it = λ¯it = 0 for any t is excluded. Suppose it is not
true. Then
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
= 0. Define kit = cit = λit = 0 for any t ≥ 1
and ci0 + w¯0λi0 = (1− δ + r¯0) ki0 + w¯0 with ci0 > 0 and λi0 ∈ (0, 1). Then∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui (cit, λit) = ui (ci0, λi0) > 0, that is a contradiction.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that t = 1 is the first period where
the consumption and leisure are positive, i.e. c¯i1 > 0 and λ¯i1 > 0 (because of
point (1)). Hence, c¯i0 = λ¯i0 = 0. Define
ci0 + w¯0λi0 = ε > 0, λi0 ∈ (0, 1), ci0 > 0, ki1 = k¯i1 − ε > 0,
ci1 = c¯i1 − (1− δ + r¯1)ε > 0, λi1 = λ¯i1, ki2 = k¯i2,
cit = c¯it, λit = λ¯it, kit+1 = k¯it+1 for any t ≥ 2.
The sequence (ci,ki,λi) belongs to the budget set of agent i. And we have,
by Assumption 4 (Inada),
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui (cit, λit) >
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
for ε suffi-
ciently close to 0. This leads to a contradiction. Hence c¯i0 > 0 and λ¯i0 > 0. By
induction, we obtain also c¯it > 0 and λ¯it > 0 for any i and any t.
(3) We have
c¯it + k¯it+1 = k¯it (1− δ + r¯t) + w¯t(1− λ¯it)
(c¯it − ε) +
(
k¯it+1 + ε
)
= k¯it (1− δ + r¯t) + w¯t
(
1− λ¯it
)
[c¯it+1 + ε (1− δ + r¯t+1)] + k¯it+2 =
(
k¯it+1 + ε
)
(1− δ + r¯t+1) + w¯t+1
(
1− λ¯it+1
)
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Then
0 ≥ ui
(
c¯it − ε, λ¯it
)
− ui
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
+βi
[
ui
(
c¯it+1 + ε (1− δ + r¯t+1) , λ¯it+1
)
− ui
(
c¯it+1, λ¯it+1
)]
≥
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it − ε, λ¯it
)
(−ε)
+βi
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it+1 + ε (1− δ + r¯t+1) , λ¯it+1
)
ε (1− δ + r¯t+1)
0 ≥ −
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it − ε, λ¯it
)
+βi
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it+1 + ε (1− δ + r¯t+1) , λ¯it+1
)
(1− δ + r¯t+1)
if ε > 0 and small enough.
Let ε go to zero. Then,
0 ≥ −
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
+ βi
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it+1, λ¯it+1
)
(1− δ + r¯t+1)
If k¯it+1 > 0, then we can take also ε < 0 small enough in absolute value and
let it go to zero to obtain the reverse inequality.
(4) Since λ¯it > 0, we can choose 0 < ε < λ¯it. Define cit = c¯it + w¯tε and
λit = λ¯it − ε. The budget constraint is satisfied. In addition, we have for
ε ∈
(
0, λ¯it
)
0 ≥ ui (cit, λit)− ui
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
≥
∂ui
∂c
(cit, λit) w¯tε+
∂ui
∂λ
(cit, λit) (−ε)
0 ≥
∂ui
∂c
(cit, λit)w¯t −
∂ui
∂λ
(cit, λit)
Let ε go to zero. Then
0 ≥ w¯t
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
−
∂ui
∂λ
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
Now, if λ¯it < 1, then we can take ε > 0 such that λ¯it+ ε < 1 and let ε go to
zero to get the reverse inequality.
(5) We have C¯t + K¯t+1 = F
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
+ (1− δ) K¯t. If K¯t = 0, then C¯t = 0
and c¯it = 0 for any i contradicting point (2).
If L¯t = 0, then we have
0 = F (K¯t, L¯t) = r¯tK¯t + w¯tL¯t = r¯tK¯t
Hence K¯t = 0, since r¯t > 0. As above, this contradicts the point (2) of the
claim.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. First, observe that the production function F satisfies Assumption 1
and
lim
b→0+
(∂F/∂L) (1, b) > 0 (21)
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Since F is homogeneous of degree one, we have, for K > 0 and L > 0,
(∂F/∂K) (K,L) = (∂F/∂K) (K/L, 1) and (∂F/∂L) (K,L) = (∂F/∂L) (1, L/K).
Let
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
be an equilibrium sequence of aggregate capital stocks and labors.
Observe that r¯t = (∂F/∂K)
(
K¯t/L¯t, 1
)
. Since F is differentiable and concave,
we have for any t
r¯t ≥ lim
a→∞
(∂F/∂K) (a, 1) (22)
Suppose the economy has a bubble in prices. Then, from Lemma 1, r¯t
converges to zero. But from (22), K¯t/L¯t tends to infinity, or equivalently, L¯t/K¯t
goes to 0. Since K¯t is positive and bounded above, we obtain L¯t → 0. Recall
that
C¯t + K¯t+1 = F
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
+ (1− δ) K¯t = K¯t
[
F
(
1, L¯t/K¯t
)
+ 1− δ
]
and choose ε > 0 such that F (1, ε)+1−δ < 1. There exists T such that for any
t > T , Kt+1 ≤ K¯t
[
F
(
1, L¯t/K¯t
)
+ 1− δ
]
< [F (1, ε) + 1− δ] K¯t. This implies
K¯t → 0 when t tends to infinity, and C¯t → 0 too.
Reconsider the first-order conditions of point (4) of Claim 5:
w¯t
∂ui
∂c
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
≤
∂ui
∂λ
(
c¯it, λ¯it
)
(23)
It is easy to see that w¯t = (∂F/∂L)
(
K¯t, L¯t
)
. Since L¯t/K¯t converges to 0,
according to (21), we have limt→∞ w¯t = limt→∞ (∂F/∂L)
(
1, L¯t/K¯t
)
> 0. We
claim that, for any i, limt→∞ λ¯it = 0. Assume the contrary: limt→∞ λ¯jt = λ¯ > 0
for some j. Since limt→∞ C¯t = 0, we have limt→∞ c¯it = 0 for any i. Thus,
lim
t→∞
[
w¯t
∂uj
∂c
(
c¯jt, λ¯jt
)]
=∞
Since
∂uj
∂λ
(
c¯jt, λ¯jt
)
λ¯jt ≤ uj
(
c¯jt, λ¯jt
)
− uj (c¯jt, 0) ≤ uj
(
c¯jt, λ¯jt
)
≤ uj (A, 1)
(23) implies a contradiction:
∞ = lim
t→∞
w¯t
∂uj
∂c
(
c¯jt, λ¯jt
)
≤ lim sup
t
∂uj
∂λ
(
c¯jt, λ¯jt
)
≤
uj (A, 1)
λ¯
<∞
Hence, for any i, limt→∞ λ¯it = 0 and limt→∞ L¯t = m, that is a contradiction.
References
[1] Becker R.A. (1980). On the long-run steady state in a simple dynamic
model of equilibrium with heterogeneous households. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 95, 375-382.
22
[2] Becker R.A. (2012). Optimal growth with heterogeneous agents and the
twisted turnpike: an example. International Journal of Economic Theory
8, 27-47.
[3] Becker R.A., J.H. Boyd III and C. Foias (1991). The existence of Ramsey
equilibrium. Econometrica 59, 441-460.
[4] Becker R.A. and C. Foias (1987). A characterization of Ramsey equilibrium.
Journal of Economic Theory 41, 173-184.
[5] Becker R.A. and C. Foias (1994). The local bifurcation of Ramsey equilib-
rium. Economic Theory 4, 719-744.
[6] Becker R.A. and C. Foias (2007). Strategic Ramsey equilibrium dynamics.
Journal of Mathematical Economics 43, 318-346.
[7] Bosi S. and T. Seegmuller (2010). On the Ramsey equilibrium with hetero-
geneous consumers and endogenous labor supply. Journal of Mathematical
Economics 46, 475-492.
[8] Florenzano M. (1999). General equilibrium of financial markets: an intro-
duction. Cahiers de la MSE 1999.76, University of Paris 1.
[9] Gale D. and A. Mas-Colell (1975). An equilibrium existence theorem for a
general model without ordered preferences. Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics 2, 9-15.
[10] Huang K.X.D. and J. Werner (2000). Asset price bubbles in Arrow-Debreu
and sequential equilibrium. Economic Theory 15, 253-278.
[11] Kocherlakota N.R. (1992). Bubbles and constraints on debt accumulation.
Journal of Economic Theory 57, 245-256.
[12] Le Van C., M.H. Nguyen and Y. Vailakis (2007). Equilibrium dynamics in
an aggregative model of capital accumulation with heterogeneous agents
and elastic labor. Journal of Mathematical Economics 43, 287-317.
[13] Le Van C. and Y. Vailakis (2003). Existence of a competitive equilibrium
in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible
investment. Economic Theory 22, 743-771.
[14] Ramsey F.P. (1928). A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal
38, 543-559.
[15] Sarte P.-D. (1997). Progressive taxation and income inequality in dynamic
competitive equilibrium. Journal of Public Economics 66, 145-171.
[16] Sorger G. (1994). On the structure of Ramsey equilibrium: cycles, indeter-
minacy, and sunspots. Economic Theory 4, 745-764.
23
[17] Sorger G. (1995). Chaotic Ramsey equilibrium. International Journal of
Bifurcation and Chaos 5, 373-380.
[18] Sorger G. (2002). On the long-run distribution of capital in the Ramsey
model. Journal of Economic Theory 105, 226-243.
[19] Sorger G. (2005). Differentiated capital and the distribution of wealth. In
Deissenberg C. and R.F. Hartl eds., Optimal Control and Dynamic Games,
Springer Verlag, 177-196.
[20] Sorger G. (2008). Strategic saving decisions in the infinite-horizon model.
Economic Theory 36, 353-377.
[21] Tirole J. (1982). On the possibility of speculation under rational expecta-
tions. Econometrica 50, 1163-1181.
[22] Tirole, J. (1985). Asset bubbles and overlapping generations. Econometrica
53, 1071-1100.
24
